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INTRODUCTION 
Elsewhere I have argued that probabilistic explanation, properly so 
called, is the explanation of things that happen by chance: the 
outcomes of irreducibly probabilistic processes)  Probabilistic 
explanation proceeds, I claimed, by producing a law-based demon- 
stration that the explanandum phenomenon had a particular prob- 
ability of obtaining and noting that, by chance, it did obtain. This 
account will presented in more detail below, but the bulk of this paper 
will be given over to a discussion of two large problems confronting 
such a view: (1) many seemingly acceptable exp!anations of chance 
phenomena do not make explicit use of laws; and (2) many seemingly 
acceptable explanations that at least purport to be probabilistic 
concern phenomena known or assumed to be deterministic. Problem 
(1) is but an instance of a very general difficulty facing law-based 
accounts of explanation, and the approach to solving it suggested 
below may readily be extended to non-probabilistic explanation. 
Problem (2) raises a difficulty peculiar to probabilistic explanation, 
but I hope to show that an appropriate solution to problem (1) offers 
the key to a plausible solution to problem (2). 
Discussions of both problems run the risk of degenerating into 
merely verbal quibbles. However, I believe that the issues concerning 
the application of the expressions 'explanation' and 'probabilistic 
explanation' which will be discussed here are genuine, and that we 
may gain understanding of explanatory practice by seeing how one 
might resolve problems (1) and (2). To revive an old way of putting it, 
there is a worthwhile analogy between 'explanation' and 'proof'. 3 
Various things have come to be called 'p roofs ' -  deductive 
arguments, experiments, testimony, and testimonials, to name a f e w -  
but when well-informed we do not allow these various things to play 
the same roles in our lives. When we do logic, science, jury duty, or 
shopping, we attend to the relevant differences among so-called 
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"proofs". Similarly, various things have come to be called 
'explanations '-deductive arguments, inductive arguments, diagnoses, 
explications of meaning, excuses, and apologies, to name a f e w -  but 
when well-informed we do not allow these various things to play the 
same roles in our lives. When we do science, engineering, politics, 
and auto repair we attend to the relevant differences among so-called 
"explanations". 'Probability', too, is applied to various things- 
degrees of belief, degrees of confirmation, relative frequencies, 
chancy dispositions, and the outcome of combinatorics, among 
others. These differences, too, must be attended to when we look for 
guidance in our lives. I hope it will be clear in what follows that what 
one says about explanation and probabilistic explanation, and thus 
what one says about 'explanation' and 'probabilistic explanation', may 
make a difference that is a difference to actual practice. 
I.  T H E  D E D U C T I V E - N O M O L O G I C A L - P R O B A B I L I S T I C  A C C O U N T  
O F  P R O B A B I L I S T I C  E X P L A N A T I O N  
The essence of probabilistic explanation, according to the deductive- 
nomological-probabilistic (D-N-P) account, is a deductive demon- 
stration to the effect that an empirical theory assigned a particular 
probability to an explanandum phenomenon. If the relevant parts of 
the theory are true, the factual premises involved accurate, and the 
deduction valid, then the D-N-P explanation is true. 4 If the premises 
are only partly true, or only approximately true, then the explanation 
may be only partly or approximately true. (Whatever partial and 
approximate truth are, this is not the place to analyze them.) 
I take it that quantum mechanics, under the dominant inter- 
pretation, gives us reason to think that there are irreducibly prob- 
abilistic processes in nature, and that they are governed by prob- 
abilistic and non-probabilistic laws. Thus, the occurrence of a given 
alpha-decay, or of particular rates of alpha-decay, is widely held to be 
the result of a physically random process: spontaneous nuclear disin- 
tegration. If the dominant interpretation of quantum mechanics is 
right, there are no "hidden variables" characterizing unknown initial 
conditions of nuclei that suffice, in conjunction with deterministic 
laws, to account for the occurrences of alpha-decay: two radio-nuclei 
may be in the same physical state at a time to, and may be subjected 
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to the same environment during the time interval from to to to + r and 
yet one may decay during r and the other not. Although this process 
is physically random in the sense that there is no "sufficient reason" 
for the one atom to decay but not the other, alpha-decay does obey 
physical laws: probabilistic laws such as those concerning barrier 
penetration and decay rate; deterministic laws such as those concern- 
ing the conservation of mass-energy and charge. Using certain sim- 
plifying assumptions, and substituting the appropriate values for 
decay energy, atomic number, and atomic weight in the Schr6dinger 
wave-equation, it is possible to derive the decay constants of radio- 
elements from quantum mechanics. Moreover, it has become con- 
ventional wisdom that such decay constants are not mere statistical 
averages drawn from large samples, but rather physically-irreducible, 
single-case probabilities-probabilities "per unit time for one 
nucleus". 5 The psi-function of the wave-equation, then, is viewed as 
giving a complete description of the state of individual systems, and 
this state-description may at best determine only a probability dis- 
tribution over future states. 
For an example of a D-N-P explanation of a particular chance fact, 
let us suppose that a Uranium 238 nucleus u has alpha-decayed 
during a time interval of length ~- which began at to. Current physical 
theory assigns a decay constant, /tz3s, to U 23s nuclei, which allows us 
to state the probability that an individual U 238 nucleus will decay 
during an interval of length t in the absence of external radiation: 
(1 -  exp (-2t238 • t)). If we assume that u was not excited by external 
radiation at to or after, we may make the following deductive- 
nomological inference: 
(la) All U 23s nuclei have probability ( 1 -  exp (-A238 • "r)) to emit 
an alpha-particle during any interval of length "r, unless sub- 
jected to environmental radiation. 
(lb) u was a U z3s nucleus at to and was not subject to environ- 
mental radiation during the interval to--( to + ~'). 
(lc) u had probability (1 - exp (-)t23s • ~')) to alpha-decay during 
to- - ( to  + "r). 
Inference (1) yields a D-N explanation of the fact that u had a 
particular probability to alpha-decay at the time in question. 
According to the D-N-P account, if (1) were prefaced with a 
236 P E T E R  R A I L T O N  
theoretical derivation of the law premise (la) from underlying quan- 
tum physics, and were followed by a parenthetic addendum to the 
effect that u did indeed alpha-decay during the interval tom(to + ~'), the 
result would be a full probabilistic explanation of u's alpha-decay. 
Schematically, a D-N-P explanation of the fact that e is G at some 




A theoretical derivation of a probabilistic law of the form 
(2b) 
Vx Vt[Fx., ~ Probability (G)~,, = r] 
(2d) Probability (G)e,to = r 
(2e) ( Ge, to). 6 
Explanation (2) is a purported probabilistic explanation in D-N-P 
form. If its premises were true and its logic impeccable, it would be a 
true one as well. 
It is obvious from the universal form of law (2a), and from the use 
of universal instantiation and modus ponens in deriving the con- 
clusion (2d), that the probability involved is a single-case probability. 
The parenthetic addendum (2e) is the explanandum, and yet it in no 
way follows from the other premises. Is this paradoxical? No" it had 
better not be derivable in this way, for we are supposing that Ge, to 
occurred by chance, and thus that its occurrence cannot be derived 
from initial conditions by any empirical law. Presumably, we knew 
that Ge,~ before any explanation was offered, and so step (2e) brings 
no news. In that sense, it is dispensible. Indeed, it is dispensible in 
another sense as well: those holding the view that explanations are 
always a r g u m e n t s - a n d  should contain nothing inessential or in- 
cidental to such arguments- will want to see the addendum gone from 
the D-N-P schema. I have no real quarrel with either reason for 
dropping it, except that it will be of use in stringing together D-N-P 
explanations or amalgamating them with larger explanations; but 
more on this later. Moreover, I would like to urge that we move away 
from the view that explanations are purely arguments and pursue in- 
stead the idea that explanations are accounts -accoun t s  in which argu- 
ments play a central role, but do not tell the whole story. Again, we will 
return to this below. For now I leave the parenthetic addendum 
in place, a token of my disaffection with the "pure argument" view. 
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It is more important to observe that the D-N-P account makes 
nothing of the degree of probability of the explanandum according to 
the explanans: in schema (2), r may take on any value in the unit 
interval without prejudice to explanation, as long, of course, as the 
probability-attribution is accurate. Thus, in contrast to Hempel's 
inductive-statistical model of probabilistic explanation, the D-N-P 
account does not require high probability either to establish the 
inductive relevance of the explanans to the explanandum (since 
deductive relevance takes its place), or to establish the nomic expec- 
tability of the explanandum (since nomic expectability "with practical 
certainty" is replaced by nomic expectability with whatever prob- 
ability the explanandum had)] This has the considerable advantage 
that we are no longer forced to say that less-than-highly-probable 
facts are inexplicable in principle. Some things that happen are vastly 
improbable, such as the decay at a given moment of an atom of U 238 
(mean life: 6.5× 10 9 years), or are merely probable, such as the 
creation of a levorotatory form when an amino acid is synthesized 
(probability under standard conditions: .5); and when merely probable 
or vastly improbable things do occur, the appropriate explanation is 
that they had a particular probability of occurring, which chanced to 
be realized. Probabilistic explanation thus is not a second-string 
substitute for deterministic explanation, showing that the explanan- 
dum phenomenon almost had to occur. On the contrary, probabilistic 
explanation is a form of explanation in its own right, charged with the 
distinctive task of dealing with phenomena that came about by 
chance. As such, there is no special explanatory virtue in probabilistic 
explanations that show their explanandum to have been highly prob- 
able, unless the explananda in question were highly probable. If they 
weren't, then any explanations purporting to establish their high 
probability would not be explanatorily virtuous, but explanatorily 
inaccurate. Probabilistic explanations conferring high probability may 
have other sorts of virtues, however: other things equal, they receive 
greater inductive support from the evidence that the explanandum 
phenomenon occurred; other things equal, they may support more 
definite policies for the future; and so on. But we should not confuse 
all of the virtues of explanations with explanatory virtues. Without 
being a better explanation, one explanation may be more easily 
confirmed, more fully confirmed, more readily applied, or more easily 
translated into modern Greek than another. 
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A satisfactory D-N-P explanation need not even pick out factors 
that raise the probability of the explanandum over what it would have 
been in their absence. 8 Consider the following example. Suppose that 
we are applying a herbicide to a patch of healthy milkweed, and 
suppose that a dose of this herbicide alters the biochemical state of 
milkweeds from a normal, healthy state S, in which plants have 
probability .9999 of surviving 24 hours, to a state S', in which there is 
but probability .05 of lasting that long. When we return to the 
milkweed patch 24 hours after spraying and find to our consternation 
that a particular plant which received a full dose of herbicide is still 
standing, how are we to explain this? Presumably, we should point 
out that the plant was in state S' after the spraying, that in this state it 
had probability .05 of surviving 24 hours, and that, by chance, it did. 
The spraying, then, is part of the explanation of survival even though 
it lowered the probability of survival for this plant from what it would 
otherwise have been. We may not wish to speak of the spraying as a 
probabilistic cause of survival, since we may want to reserve the 
expression 'probabilistic cause" for factors that do raise the prob- 
ability of an event in the circumstances. Thus, for those plants failing 
to survive, we could speak of the spraying as a probabilistic cause of 
their deaths, while for the plant that survived, it would be strained at 
best to speak of the spraying as a probabilistic cause of its survival. 
This suggests that probabilistic explanation is not a mere subspecies 
of causal explanation. 9 
It might be objected that if probabilistic explanations do not es- 
tablish high probability for their explananda or do not point to factors 
that raise the probability of their explananda, then how do they show 
why one outcome-  alpha-decay, survival, or whatever-  was realized 
rather than its opposite? The short answer is that they do not show 
this and should not try. If there were a reason why one probabilistic 
outcome of a chance process was realized rather than another, we 
would not be dealing with a chance process. 
Finally, because the D-N-P account is deductive in form and based 
upon lawful, physical, single-case probabilities, it can be shown not to 
suffer from the problems of explanatory ambiguity and epistemic 
relativity that have bedeviled the Hempelian inductive-statistical ac- 
count. ~° If the very same fact were to be assigned two different 
lawful, physical, single-case probabilities by our theory, then con- 
tradiction, not ambiguity, would have to be dealt with, and we should 
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proceed accordingly. As for epistemic relativity, incomplete know- 
ledge may make something look like a genuinely probabilistic law or a 
genuine probabilistic explanation, but it cannot make things be other 
than they are. This is strictly parallel with non-probabilistic explana- 
tion: in both cases there are problems about distinguishing laws from 
mere factual regularities; in both cases there are problems about 
distinguishing the true from the false. This is not to say that there are no 
special epistemological problems in the probabilistic case, but only to 
say that these problems are epistemological and do not make successful 
explanation independent of either lawfulness or truth. 
With this brief sketch of the D-N-P account in hand, let us turn to 
two important problems it faces. 
I I .  P R O B A B I L I S T I C  E X P L A N A T I O N S  W I T H O U T  L A W S  
A difficulty that arises at once for the D-N-P account is that many of 
the probabilistic explanations offered and accepted in scientific dis- 
course fall far short of providing all of the elements of schema (2). 
We have encountered an example already in the explanation given of a 
particular milkweed plant's survival: 
(3) "the plant was in state S' after the spraying . . . .  in this 
state it had probability .05 of surviving 24 hours, and . . . .  
by chance, it did". 
Explanation (3) contains no theoretical derivation, no explicit law, 
and yet seems highly acceptable. Other less-than-full-fledged prob- 
abilistic explanations encountered in scientific contexts are bare in- 
deed: "Why did this muon decay? -  Because it was unstable"; "Why 
is the Geiger counter clicking as we approach that rock?-  Because it 
contains uranium"; "Why is this one lobster b lue?- I t ' s  a random 
mutation, very rare"; and so on. Proffered probabilistic explanations 
may fail to include all of the elements of (2) for a variety of reasons: 
in certain contexts, a more elaborate explanation may be out of 
place-  the audience may be too well-versed, not well-versed enough, 
not interested enough, or short on time; a more elaborate explanation 
may not be available even if it were appropriate-the relevant laws 
and facts may not be known, or may be known only qualitatively; the 
person offering the explanation may simply not know enough; and so 
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on. Whatever  the reason, does the D-N-P account  force us to say that 
these less-than-full-fledged specimens are not explanations? 
In many cases, that would be an intolerably strict position to take. 
But where should one draw the line between explanation and non- 
explanation? The answer lies in not drawing lines, at least at this 
point, and in recognizing instead a continuum of explanatoriness. The 
extreme ends of this continuum may be characterized as follows. At 
one end we find what I will call an ideal D-N-P text, comprising all 
that schema (2) involves. At the other end we find statements com- 
pletely devoid of what I will call "explanatory  information".  11 What is 
explanatory information? Consider an ideal D-N-P text for the 
explanation of a fact  p. Now consider any statement S that, were we 
ignorant of this text  but conversant  with the language and concepts 
employed in it and in S, would enable us to answer questions about 
this text in such a way as to eliminate some degree of uncertainty 
about what is contained in it. To the extent  that S enables us to give 
accurate answers to such questions, i.e., to the extent  that it enables 
us to reconstruct  this text  or otherwise illuminates the features of this 
text,  we may say that S provides explanatory information concerning 
why p. It is hardly novel to speak of sentences conveying information 
about complete texts in this way: presumably we employ such a 
notion whenever  we talk of a piece of writing or an ut terance as a 
summary,  paraphrase,  gloss, condensation,  or partial description of 
an actual text,  such as a novel, a speech, or a news report.  Un- 
fortunately,  I know of no satisfactory account  of this familiar and 
highly general notion, and so cannot  appeal to one here. Nor  can I 
begin to provide an account  of my own making within this text. To 
make matters worse,  I cannot even pretend to be using the well- 
defined notion of information employed in Wiener-Shannon infor- 
mation theory.  However ,  before  I say anything more about the sort of 
analysis that is needed for the concept  of information employed here, 
let us look at a few examples to see of what use that concept  might be. 
To be told that a Geiger counter  is clicking because it is near a 
uranium-bearing rock is to be given explanatory in fo rma t ion -  
assuming that the claim is true as far as it g o e s -  since it would be 
part of the relevant ideal D-N-P text  for  the clicking that the rock in 
question contains uranium. Of course, the ideal D-N-P text  would go 
on to tell us about  the radioactivity of uranium, about the process 
of alpha-decay, about the mechanics of Geiger counters,  and so on. 
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Obviously, the amount of explanatory information provided by the 
brief and informal explanation given above is much less than the 
amount needed to reconstruct a sizeable chunk of the entire ideal 
D-N-P text, sufficing only to illuminate one central feature of the 
whole text. But to illuminate one central feature is to convey a not 
insignificant amount of information, and thus to be off the zero point 
of our continuum. Somewhat nearer that point, but still above it, is 
the explanation "Why did this muon decay? - Because it was un- 
stable". This explanation accurately points to a dispositional property 
of the muon responsible for the decay, distinguishing this decay from 
disintegration due to external forces such as bombardment by other 
particles; and as we know from the shortcomings of extensionalist 
accounts of dispositional properties, it is one thing to say that the 
muon decayed, and something else-something more-  to say that it 
decayed owing to a disposition to do so. The disposition in this case is 
probabilistic, and so the relevant ideal explanatory text would be 
D-N-P in form. The brief statement about instability thus answers 
certain questions about the form as well as the content of the relevant 
ideal text. The explanation of a lobster's blueness in terms of a 
"random mutation, very rare" also tells us that the relevant explana- 
tory text is D-N-P in form, and further indicates the particular 
probabilistic process involved-genetic mutat ion-and provides a 
qualitative characterization of the probability of blueness. Thus it 
falls higher on the explanatory continuum than the Geiger counter 
clicking or muon decay explanations. A bit higher on the con- 
tinuum is what (3) says about the explanation of a particular milk- 
weed plant's survival. (3), too, tells us that the relevant ideal text is 
D-N-P in form, and mentions an important factor in the process 
culminating in the explanandum - the spraying - but it further supplies 
a precise, quantitative evaluation of the probability involved. Much 
higher on the continuum are the explanatory remarks made earlier 
about the alpha-decay of U 238 nucleus u, for they contained a prob- 
abilistic law explicitly and roughed out a theoretical derivation of this 
law. Higher still are the well-developed explanatory accounts one 
finds in physics or chemistry textbooks and monographs. These are 
not usually explanations of particular facts, but our characterization 
of explanatory information is indifferent as to whether p is a parti- 
cular or general fact. Moreover, outside the context of standard 
teaching and reference works, scientists are often concerned with 
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particular-fact explanation-e.g.,  in the course of experimentation- 
and, as the D-N-P account recognizes, elaborate theoretical deriva- 
tions have a natural place in fully developed explanations of parti- 
cular facts. 
Perhaps this is the point at which to say something more about 
What the theoretical derivations figuring in schema (2) might look like. 
The place to look for guidance is plainly scientific explanatory prac- 
tice itself. If one inspects the best-developed explanations in physics 
or chemistry textbooks and monographs, one will observe that these 
accounts typically include not only derivations of lower-level laws 
and generalizations from higher-level theory and facts, but also 
attempts to elucidate the mechanisms at work. Thus an account of 
alpha-decay ordinarily does more than solve the wave-equation for 
given radionuclei and their alpha-particles; it also provides a model of 
the nucleus as a potential well, shows how alpha-decay is an example 
of the general phenomenon of potential-barrier penetration ("tun- 
nelling"), discusses decay products and sequences, and so on. Some 
simplifying assumptions are invariably made, along with an expres- 
sion of hope that as we learn more about the nucleus and the forces 
involved we will be able to give a more realistic physical model. It 
seems to me implausible to follow the old empiricist line and treat all 
these remarks on mechanisms, models, and so on as mere marginalia, 
incidental to the "real explanation", the law-based inference to the 
explanandum. I do not have anything very definite to say about what 
would count as "elucidating the mechanisms at work"-probabil is t ic  
or otherwise-  but it seems clear enough that an account of scientific 
explanation seeking fidelity to scientific explanatory practice should 
recognize that part of scientific ideals of explanation and understand- 
ing is a description of the mechanisms at work, where this includes, 
but is not merely, an invocation of the relevant laws. Theories 
broadly conceived, complete with fundamental notions about how 
nature works-corpuscularianism, action-at-a-distance theory, ether 
theory, atomic theory, elementary particle theory, the hoped-for 
unified field theory, e t c . - n o t  laws alone, are the touchstone in 
explanation. Of course, there are marginal comments to be found 
accompanying the explanations offered in scientific textbooks and 
monographs: one reads of helpful ways of visualizing, conceptualizing, 
applying mathematical devices, etc., which the reader is warned not 
to take too seriously. There is no hard and fast line between simplified 
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idealizations of actual physical processes - such as the model of a gas 
as a collection of perfectly elastic spheres or the "liquid-drop" model 
of the atomic nucleus-  and more genuine marginalia or heurist ics-  
such as the treatment of electron orbits as harmonic vibrations of 
strings, the analogy between electrostatics and hydrostatics, the use 
of topological images in describing systems with multiple equilibria, 
and so on. Moreover, one theory's attempt at a realistic model may 
serve as no more than a first-order approximation for later develop- 
ments of that theory-e .g . ,  atomic theory in this century. Genuine 
marginalia and heuristics are usually flagged as such, but in a develop- 
ing theory there may be indefiniteness about whether a given model 
should be taken in a realistic and explanatory way or as an unrealistic 
"picture" with instrumental value only. No analysis of explanation 
should be more definite on such questions than the best available 
theories themselves; so while we should ask of scientists whether a 
particular model ought to be part of ideal explanatory texts, we 
should be prepared to accept indefiniteness and even disagreement in 
the answers we receive. 
At a particular time we may have nothing like the knowledge 
necessary to produce an ideal D-N-P text for a given chance 
phenomenon. Not knowing fully what the relevant ideal text looks 
like, we evidently will be unable in many cases to say how much 
explanatory information a given proffered explanation carries. But 
again, it is not the job of an analysis of explanation to settle questions 
beyond the reach of existing empirical science. Instead, it is ap- 
propriate and adequate that an analysis of explanation define what 
would be explanatory information in such cases. On the analysis 
given here, a proffered explanation supplies explanatory information 
(whether we recognize it as such or not) to the extent that it does in 
fact (whether we know it or not) correctly answer questions about the 
relevant ideal text. Whether in a given context we regard a proffered 
explanation as embodying explanatory information, in light of the 
interpretation we impose on it and our epistemic condition generally, 
is a matter for the pragmatics of explanation. 
The general form of the ideal D-N-P text is meant to represent the 
ideal striven for in actual explanatory practice, i.e., it comprises the 
things that a research program seeks to discover in developing the 
capacity to produce better explanations of chance phenomena. Thus, 
the ideal D-N-P text reflects not only an ideal of explanation, but of 
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scientific understanding: we may say that we understand why a given 
chance phenomenon occurred to the extent that we are able, at least 
in principle, to produce the relevant ideal D-N-P text or texts. 
However, the concept of scientific understanding-and its links to 
ideals of explanation and to fundamental conceptions of nature-  
deserve more serious treatment than it can be given here. Needless to 
say, even if we did possess the ability to fill out arbitrarily extensive 
bits of ideal explanatory texts, and in this sense thoroughly under- 
stood the phenomena in question, we would not always find it 
appropriate to provide even a moderate portion of the relevant ideal 
texts in response to particular why-questions. On the contrary, we 
would tailor the explanatory information provided in a given context 
to the needs of that context; if we had the capacity to supply 
abitrarily large amounts of explanatory information, there would be 
no need to flaunt it. 
As mentioned earlier, there is no ready-made analysis of in- 
formation capable of doing the work here asked of the concept of 
information. The sort of information discussed in information theory 
is syntactic, a measure of the statistical rarity of signals from an 
observed source, and the sort discussed here is semantic, it is in- 
formation about something (an ideal text). 12 However, there is an 
important analogy that makes the same term applicable: in both cases 
the amount of information carried by a "message" is proportional to 
the degree to which it reduces uncertainty; thus a statistically com- 
mon signal from a stable source embodies less information than a 
statistically rare one, and a fuller proffered explanation leaves less to 
be known about the relevant ideal text than a slighter one. Hence, 
information is a kind of selection power over possibilities. But here 
the analogy ends. Semantic equivalents, such as 'son' and 'male 
offspring', as signals may require different amounts of information to 
be transmitted; and there is no guarantee whatsoever that a message 
embodying huge amounts of syntactic information (and so requiring a 
great deal of channel capacity to transmit) will embody much if any 
semantic information-witness certain television test patterns (and 
perhaps certain programs as well). It is rather elusive of me to speak 
of explanatory information without having an adequate theory of 
semantic information, but none of us has an adequate theory of 
semantic information and the notion still receives very heavy use. I 
trust that as I join the multitude it is intuitively (deceptively?) clear 
what this notion involves. 
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Perhaps a few things might be said by way of clarification. If a 
self-consistent sentence S implies a sentence S*, then S contains at 
least as much semantic information as S*. Thus, for example, 'p '  is at 
least as informative as 'p v q', since 'p' reduces the range of 
possibilities at least as much as 'p v q'; and 'p & q' is at least as 
informative as 'p' or 'q' alone, since the conjunction reduces the 
range of possibilities at least as much as either individual conjunct. If 
S is a tautology, then S contains no semantic information (at least, if 
we take logic for granted), since S eliminates no (logical) possibilities. 
If S contains semantic information I(S), and S* contains semantic 
information I(S*), and if the conjunction of S and S* is self-con- 
sistent, then the amount of semantic information contained in the 
conjunct will equal I(S) plus I(S*) minus any overlap. And so on. In 
these properites of semantic information it may be seen that, as with 
syntactic information, this quantity bears something of an inverse 
relation to probability. Propositions with logical probability one, 
tautologies, convey zero semantic information; conjunction raises 
semantic information, but for independent events it lowers prob- 
ability; disjunction lowers semantic information, but for independent 
events it raises probability; and so on. But a thicket of problems 
confronts any attempt to press an analysis of semantic information, 
or its formal parallels with syntactic information, much further. First, 
if we are going to speak of semantic information as reducing un- 
certainty, we must have a probability measure of the appropriate 
kind. The Carnap-Bar-Hillel approach to semantic information uses 
Carnapian logical probability, but this brings with it grave problems, t3 
Second, to talk of the semantic content of a sentence is to assume 
some semantic interpretation of it, and this raises a number of issues: 
What sort of semantics should we use? Must semantic interpretation 
be a function of context? What constraints must be met in order for a 
semantic interpretation to exist? And so on. For our purposes I 
propose to ignore the general questions about semantic interpretation 
and speak only of uncertainty as a measure of the extent to which, in 
what I will call a "standard context", one is unable to reconstruct 
particular or general features of the relevant ideal explanatory text. 
Clearly, any general analysis of semantic information would have to 
provide a measure of the extent to which a given sentence allows us, 
in a variety of contexts, to "recover" or "reconstruct" an aspect of 
the world itself. It is less problematic, though by no means easy, to 
treat of semantic information in a particular kind of context and with 
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respect to a definite text. The sort of standard context [ have in mind 
is the following: one understands all of the concepts and terms used 
in the relevant ideal text and in the proffered explanation, but is 
ignorant of the overall structure and the details of that ideal text. 
Hereinafter, when I speak of a proffered explanation conveying 
explanatory information, I will mean that it would do so in the 
appropriate standard context. 14 
The account of explanatory information just outlined is liable to 
trivialization. For example, suppose that an alpha-decay occurs, and 
suppose that someone proffers the following "explanation": "the 
relevant ideal text contains more than 10 2 words in English". For all 
that has been said here, this remark, if true (as it doubtless is), would 
count as conveying explanatory information and hence as some sort 
of an explanation. The first line of defense against this kind of 
degenerate case would be to say that the information must be about 
the content and not merely the form of the relevant ideal text. But 
this is not satisfactory, for it certainly is explanatory to be told, of the 
alpha-decay, that the relevant ideal text is probabilistic rather than 
deterministic in form. In order to avoid further complication, I will 
simply tolerate this kind of degenerate case, relegating it to the very 
low end of the continuum of explanatoriness. And rightfully enough: 
it certainly does not afford much illumination of the relevant ideal 
explanatory text. 
In sum, proffered explanations of chance phenomena that fail to 
live up to the standards of the D-N-P schema may still count as 
explanations, even as quite good explanations, in virtue of finding 
another way of communicating explanatory information. In context, 
such explanations may be more than adequate. 
What has been said here about the potential explanatoriness of 
statements lacking strict D-N-P form can be extended in obvious 
ways to non-probabilistic explanations and may be used to replace the 
justly criticized idea that the D-N schema provides necessary con- 
ditions for successful explanations. I would argue that the D-N 
schema instead provides the skeletal form for ideal explanatory texts 
of non-probabilistic phenomena, where these ideal texts in turn afford 
a yardstick against which to measure the explanatoriness of proffered 
explanations in precisely the same way that ideal D-N-P texts afford a 
yardstick for proffered explanations of chance phenomena. Thus, 
proffered explanations of non-probabilistic phenomena may take 
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various forms and yet still be successful in virtue of communicating 
information about the relevant ideal text. For example, an ideal text 
for the explanation of the outcome of a causal process would look 
something like this: an inter-connected series of law-based accounts 
of all the nodes and links in the causal network culminating in the 
explanandum, complete with a fully detailed description of the causal 
mechanisms involved and theoretical derivations of all the covering 
laws involved. This full-blown causal account would extend, via 
various relations of reduction and supervenience, to all levels of 
analysis, i.e., the ideal text would be closed under relations of causal 
dependence, reduction, and supervenience. It would be the whole 
story concerning why the explanandum occurred, relative to a correct 
theory of the lawful dependencies of the world. Such an ideal causal 
D-N text would be infinite if time were without beginning or infinitely 
divisible, and plainly there is no question of ever setting such an ideal 
text down on paper. (Indeed, if time is continuous, an ideal causal 
text might have to be non-denumerably infinite- and thus "ideal" in a 
very strong sense.) But it is clear that a whole range of less-than-ideal 
proffered explanations could more or less successfully convey in- 
formation about such an ideal text and so be more or less successful 
explanations, even if not in D-N form. 
It is preposterous to suggest that any such ideal could exist for 
scientific explanation and understanding? Has anyone ever attempted 
or even wanted to construct an ideal causal or probabilistic text? It is 
not preposterous if we recognize that the actual ideal is not to 
produce such texts, but to have the ability (in principle) to produce 
arbitrary parts of them. It is thus irrelevant whether individual scien- 
tists ever set out to fill in ideal texts as wholes, since within the 
division of labor among scientists it is possible to find someone (or, 
more precisely, some group) interested in developing the ability to fill 
in virtually any particular aspect of ideal tex ts -macro  or micro, 
fundamental or "phenomenological", stretching over experimental or 
historical or geological or cosmological time, A chemist may be 
uninterested in how the reagents he handles came into being; a 
cosmologist may be interested in just that; a geologist may be 
interested in how those substances came to be distributed over the 
surface of the earth; an evolutionary biologist may be interested in 
how chemists (and the rest of us) came into being; an anthropologist 
or historian may be interested in how man and material came into 
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contact with one another. To the extent that there are links and 
nodes, at whatever level of analysis, which we could not even in 
principle fill in, we may say that we do not completely understand the 
phenomenon under study. 
The full explanatory history of a given phenomenon may have both 
causal and probabilistic links; for example, the click of a Geiger 
counter placed near a rock is due to geological causes as well as 
spontaneous alpha-decay. There is no problem in saying that an ideal 
explanatory text for a given fact contains both D-N and D-N-P 
subparts, so long as we do not try to treat the very same links as both 
probabilistic and non-probabilistic. 
As we noticed earlier, in cases of genuine probabilistic explanation 
there are certain why-questions that simply do not have answers-  
questions as to why one probability rather than another was realized in a 
given case. We now are in a position to say what this comes to: such why- 
questions are requests for information that simply is not available - no 
part of even the ideal explanatory text contains a sufficient reason why 
one probability was realized rather than another. That is, this request for 
further explanation is refused, not because we do not know enough, but 
because there is simply nothing more to be known. 15 Nor is this the only 
sort of case in which a why-question may be refused. In any theory, 
probabilistic or otherwise, there will be certain matters of ultimate brute 
fact or of absolutely fundamental law. Purported ideal explanatory texts 
based upon a theory may simply lack the material needed to provide 
answers to certain requests for further explanatory information. For 
example, current physics offers us no reason why there is no negative 
gravity, despite the fact that there is both negative and positive charge 
(perhaps this is an initial condition of our universe), nor does it offer a 
reason why mass-energy is conserved rather than not (this seems to be a 
fundamental law). At most basic level, it may be difficult to 
distinguish fundamental laws from initial conditions of the entire 
universe, but that is not the point at issue here. The point is that a theory 
may legitimately spurn certain requests for further explanation in both 
probabilistic and non-probabilistic cases, and we can now say what such 
spurning consists in: the absence of certain things from purported ideal 
explanatory texts based upon that theory. 
Where the orthodox covering-law account of explanation propound- 
ed by Hempel and others was right has been in claiming that 
explanatory practice in the sciences is in a central way law-seeking or 
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nomothetic. Where it went wrong was in interpreting this fact as 
grounds for saying that any successful explanation must succeed 
either in virtue of explicitly invoking covering laws or by implicitly 
asserting the existence of such laws. It is difficult to dispute the claim 
that scientific explanatory pract ice-whether  engaged in causal, 
probabilistic, reductive, or functional explanation-aims ultimately 
(though not exclusively) at uncovering laws. This aim is reflected in 
the account offered here in the structure of ideal explanatory texts: 
their backbone is a series of law-based deductions. But it is equally 
difficult to dispute the claim that many proffered explanations succeed 
in doing some genuine explaining without either using laws explicitly 
or (somehow) tacitly asserting their existence. This fact is reflected 
here in the analysis offered of explanatoriness, which is treated as a 
matter of providing accurate information about the relevant ideal 
explanatory text, where this information may concern features of that 
text other than laws. For definiteness, let us call the analysis of 
explanation offered here the nomothetic account of scientific 
explanation. 
I l I .  T H E  U S E  O F  S T A T I S T I C S  A N D  
P R O B A B I L I T I E S  I N  T H E  E X P L A N A T I O N  
O F  N O N - P R O B A B I L I S T I C  P H E N O M E N A  
Now that the nomothetic account of probabilistic and causal 
explanation has been introduced, we are in a position to deal with the 
second of the two problems posed at the outset. Thus far it has been 
assumed that the proffered probabilistic explanations we have con- 
sidered are purported explanations of indeterministic phenomena, so 
that the relevant ideal texts (or the relevant portions of more com- 
prehensive ideal texts) are D-N-P in form. But what if a seemingly 
probabilistic explanation is offered of a phenomenon brought about in 
a deterministic way? Must we dismiss all such explanations as worth- 
tess? Would not this make many important statistical explanations in 
science-e.g. ,  in classical statistical mechanics-worthless? But 
surely we cannot say that. 
Fortunately, there is no need to make such a sweeping dismissal of 
statistical explanations of non-random phenomena. For while statis- 
tical explanations of phenomena not due to chance cannot be 
explanatory in virtue of providing information about a relevant ideal 
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D-N-P text, since there is no such text, they may be explanatory in 
virtue of providing information about a relevant ideal D-N text, since 
there is just such a thing. To see this, let us look briefly and 
informally at two important cases of statistical explanation of non- 
random phenomena: classical statistical mechanics and "explanation 
by correlation". 
The foundations of statistical mechanics evoke a wealth of difficult 
issues that cannot be considered here. Moreover, classical statistical 
mechanics has been replaced by quantum statistical mechanics, so it 
is no longer accurate to say that thermodynamic phenomena (for 
example) do not involve real indeterminacy at all. To simplify mat- 
ters, I will stick to the classical case, which will enable me to discuss 
a view that has been and continues to be widely held: if classical 
statistical mechanics were right and no indeterminacy were involved 
in thermodynamic phenomena, the statistical explanations of the 
classical theory would be genuinely explanatory. I have in mind 
familiar explanations of such facts as the tendency of closed systems 
to move toward and stay near equilibrium, the functional correlation 
of macroscopic thermodynamical variables for gases at equilibrium 
(e.g., the ideal gas law, PV = k T ) ,  etc., in terms of the most common 
micro-states in an ensemble created by permutations of molecules 
over a constrained phase space (Boltzmann) or in terms of average 
values over all possible micro-states in a constrained phase space 
(Gibbs). For any given gas, its particular state S at a time t will be 
determined solely by its molecular constitution, its initial condition, 
the deterministic laws of classical dynamics operating upon this initial 
condition, and the boundary conditions to which it has been subject. 
Therefore, the ideal explanatory text for its being in state S at time t 
will not be probabilistic, but will be a complete causal history of the 
time-evolution of that gas. Now if the ideal explanatory text is purely 
deterministic, how could one explain the fact that the gas is in state S 
at time t by reference to "most probable" macrostates or "phase 
averages"? After all, these "probabilities" and "averages" are the 
product of sheer combinatorics under certain limiting assumptions, 
with no guarantee that the gas in question met these limiting assump- 
tions and with no regard to the fact that the gas had definite initial 
conditions, not a probability distribution over initial conditions. 
Briefly, the answer is that such appeals to combinatorics serve to 
illuminate a significant feature of the causal process underlying the 
behavior of classical thermodynamic systems, thereby serving to 
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partially illuminate the relevant ideal explanatory texts in particular 
cases. For example, various proofs in ergodic theory and related 
results show that if a gas is in an initial condition that obeys a 
relatively few constraints, it will, over infinite time, spend most of its 
time at or near equilibrium. This illuminates a modal feature of the 
causal processes involved and therefore a modal feature of the 
relevant ideal explanatory texts: this sort of causal process is such 
that its macroscopic outcomes are remarkably insensitive (in the 
limit) to wide variations in initial microstates. The stability of an 
outcome of a causal process in spite of significant variation in initial 
conditions can be informative about an ideal causal explanatory text 
in the same way that it is informative to learn, regarding a given 
causal explanation of the First World War, that a world war would 
have come about (according to this explanation) even if no bomb had 
exploded in Sarajevo. This sort of robustness or resilience of a 
process is important to grasp in coming to know explanations based 
upon it. Traditional worries about the applicability of ergodic proofs 
and related results to systems finite in time and degrees of freedom do 
not go away, on this view. But for those who have held that these 
worries can be dealt with, we now have a way of capturing the 
intuition that ergodic theory and its kin are somehow explanatory: 
they shed light on a modal feature of the casual processes underlying 
thermodynamic behavior, thus providing information about the rele- 
vant ideal causal texts. Since we almost never know the actual initiat 
condition of a gas in any detail, this sort of modal information about 
the causal process involved in the time-evolution of classical gases is 
especially valuable. 
Statistical generalizations about macro- and micro-states of ther- 
modynamic systems-e.g. ,  "closed systems are seldom found in 
states with measure zero (in the natural measure)"-also may play a 
role in explaining thermodynamic behavior, such as the prevalence of 
equilibrium. However, the role they play is not that of illuminating 
lawful features of the processes underlying such behavior, but rather 
that of providing information about the factual premises of the 
relevant ideal explanatory texts. Thus, it should be no mystery that 
statistical generalizations believed not to reflect underlying prob- 
abilistic laws may still be explanatory, once we recognize that they func- 
tion in explanation not as ersatz laws but as summaries of information 
about initial conditions and boundary conditions. 
It would be excessively fastidious to insist that classical statistical 
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mechanics offers no probabilistic explanations only if this were tan- 
tamount to insisting that it could offer no explanations, i.e., could 
provide no explanatory information. We have seen that classical- 
statistical-mechanical arguments can provide explanatory information 
concerning purely non-probabilistic processes. Thus classical statis- 
tical mechanics need hardly be dismissed as non-explanatory, al- 
though one must be careful in stating what it does and does not 
explain. Most crucially, it does not explain why the initial conditions 
should be such that we observe the macroscopic regularities in 
thermodynamic behavior that we do. This shows up on the present 
account in the fact that these initial conditions can be traced back- 
wards through ideal causal texts only to still earlier conditions, not to 
laws. Thus the prevalence of equilibrium and other such features of 
macroscopic behavior must, on the classical theory, ultimately be 
attributed to brute fact and to the operation of deterministic laws on 
brute fact. But given a certain range of initial conditions, classical 
statistical mechanics does provide explanations of macroscopic 
behavior. The charge of excessive fastidiousness seems doubly un- 
earned in light of the fact that classical statistical mechanics itself 
tells us that the relevant ideal explanatory texts are deterministic. 
The second sort of statistical explanation that is frequently offered 
of phenomena known or believed not to be indeterministic falls under 
the general (often pejorative) heading "explanation by correlation". 
To this species belong the many efforts to use the direct results of 
multivariate analysis and other statistical techniques as explanations 
of the behavior of (often complex) causal systems. It is unnecessary in 
this connection to delve into the details of explanations of this kind, 
for the point to be made is highly general: the nomothetic account 
enables us to see how statements of statistical correlations may function 
not only as evidence for causal connections, but also as sources of 
information about aspects of ideal causal explanatory texts. Thus, a 
statement that there is a "statistically significant" correlation between 
exposure to high levels of cotton fiber in the air and incidence of brown 
lung disease may be put forward to explain why textile workers in cotton 
mills experience abnormally high rates of brown lung. Here the 
explanation may involve an irreducibly probabilistic process, but it need 
not. Let us suppose for the sake of illustration that it does not; still, the 
statement of correlation may convey information about the relevant 
causal ideal text for explaining the frequency of brown lung among 
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cotton mill workers, since it points to a substance, cotton fiber, the 
presence of which in the air breathed is an important element of this text. 
In this light, claims about the "strength" of a correlation, or about the 
amount of variation in one variable that can be "statistically explained" 
in terms of the variation of another, may be seen as ways of providing 
information about the extent and independence of the roles of various 
factors in relevant ideal explanatory texts. 
It would be a naive view to equate the use of statistical correlations 
with probabilistic explanation, and we should not accuse scientists 
making heavy use of correlations- often because of limitations in the 
available evidence, limitations on possible experimentation, and the 
sheer complexity of the systems s tud ied -o f  offering probabilistic 
explanations of phenomena they suspect are deterministic. 
"Explanation by correlation", of course, does not always provide 
genuinely explanatory information-correlations may be accidental, 
epiphenomenal, mediated by other variables, misleading about the 
direction of causation, or otherwise explanatorily defective. But even 
so, some such correlations may provide a limited amount of in- 
formation about the relevant ideal explanatory texts. Thus, failure to 
detect an intervening variable may weaken an explanation greatly, but 
that explanation may still pick out factors with some causal role even 
if it misrepresents the directness and importance of their contribution. 
Clearly, "explanation by correlation" needs further and deeper 
treatment than it can be given here. But I hope that it is equally clear 
how the nomothetic account enables us to say that statements of 
statistical correlation may function as (partial) explanations in virtue 
of providing (partial) information about relevant ideal explanatory 
texts, even when these are not probabilistic. 
Finally, while it is important to recognize that statistical general- 
izations of various sorts may provide explanatory information 
concerning non-probabilistic phenomena, it is important as well to 
recognize the difference it makes to explanatory practice whether or 
not a given phenomenon is viewed as being fundamentagly prob- 
abilistic. For example, quantum mechanics, with its underlying prob- 
abilism, initially confronted a resistance from scientists quite unlike 
that meeting classical statistical mechanics, with its underlying 
determinism. Furthermore, there are differences in the research pro- 
grams supported by these two theories: in the latter case we find 
sustained work in physics and mathematics to account for statistical 
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features of systems in terms of "hidden variables", in the former case 
we f ind-af te r  considerable debate-widespread acceptance of the 
non-existence of "hidden variables" and work in physics and 
mathematics to demonstrate the "completeness" of the quantum 
theory. These differences in the history of theory-acceptance and 
theory-development are the sort of thing that a satisfactory account 
of scientific explanation ought to illuminate, but an account of prob- 
abilistic explanation that fails to demarcate "statistical" explanations 
of deterministic processes (as in classical statistical mechanics) from 
probabilistic explanations of indeterministic processes (as in quantum 
mechanics) tends to obscure rather than clarify these differences. 
Unlike many of its competitors, the nomothetic account of prob- 
abilistic explanat ion-based as it is on the D-N-P mode l -makes  
precisely this demarcation, and in so doing helps us to understand 
these features of scientific explanatory practice. In this way, an 
account of explanation may itself do some explanatory work by 
accounting for a difference in practice in terms of a difference in 
theory. At first blush, one might think that whenever statistics or 
probabilities are involved in explanatory practice one is dealing with a 
form of probabitistic explanation. However,  this illusion is quickly 
shed once one recognizes the variety of ways in which statistics and 
probabilities figure in explanatory activities. Perhaps the commonest 
use of statistics and probabilities in connection with explanation is 
epistemic: they are used in the process of assembling and assessing 
evidence for causal and non-causal explanations alike. Somewhat less 
common, but still important, are such uses as those discussed above: 
statistics and probabilities are used in providing explanatory in- 
formation about causal and non-causal processes and their initial 
conditions. In some cases of the last sort we have genuine prob- 
abilistic explanation, specifically, in those cases where information is 
provided about a physically indeterministic process. 
Some have protested that accepting the existence of fundamentally 
probabilistic phenomena amounts to a resignation of intellectual res- 
ponsibility, to an abandonment of curiosity. Plainly it would be 
irresponsible to accept without reservation the hypothesis that a 
process is probabilistic on the basis of scanty examination and weak 
evidence, but it would be irresponsible to accept any hypothesis 
without reservation in such circumstances. And surely no one can 
argue that acceptance of the irreducible probabilism of quantum 
mechanics is based upon scanty examination or weak evidence. 
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M o r e o v e r ,  as we no ted  earl ier ,  the exp lana t ions  offered by  a n u m b e r  
of h is tor ica l ly  s ignif icant  scientif ic  theor ies  m u s t  come  to an  end  
somewhere .  A c c e p t a n c e  of a l awful  p robabi l i s t i c  r e la t ionsh ip  as fun-  
d a m e n t a l  on  the bas i s  of o v e r w h e l m i n g  ev idence  is no  grea ter  ba r  
to the  g rowth  of sc ience  t han  is a c c e p t a n c e  of  a lawful  de te rmin i s t i c  
re la t ionsh ip  as f u n d a m e n t a l  on the basis  of equa l ly  good ev idence .  
Cer t a in ly  the h i s tory  of q u a n t u m  m e c h a n i c s  provides  s t ronger  sup-  
por t  for this claim than  any  a priori a r g u m e n t  poss ib ly  could:  the 
deepen ing  and  w iden ing  of scientif ic knowledge  u n d e r  q u a n t u m  
theory  gives the lie to those  who prophes ied  that  exp l ana t ion  by  
chance  would  be the e n e m y  of en la rged  inqu i ry  and  unde r s t and ing .  
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are meant to indicate that it is not a logical consequence of the steps above it. More will 
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9 I have borrowed this example of a plant surviving herbicide spraying from Nancy 
Cartwright (in conversation), who used it to make a different point. I am, of course, 
assuming that the effect of the herbicide is genuinely probabilistic - perhaps owing its 
indeterminism to the chance factors (such as electron location) that influence chemical 
bonding. 
~o See, for example, Hempel, 'Aspects', section 3, and 'Maximal Specificity and 
Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation', Philosophy of Science 35 (1968), pp. 116- 
133. 
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~t I owe the expression 'explanatory information' to David Lewis, who, in the course 
of advising my dissertation on explanation, supplied me with this notion as a way of 
expressing the idea of illuminating ideal explanatory texts. I do not know whether he 
would agree with the way I am using this notion here. 
~2 For a discussion of the differences between "information about" and Wiener- 
Shannon information, see Colin Cherry, On Human Communication, second edition 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1%6), chapter 6. 
~3 See Y. Bar-Hillel and R. Carnap, 'Semantic Information', British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 4 (1953), 147-157. It should be noted that a proffered explanation 
may communicate some explanatory information in virtue of the organization of its 
components as well as their content proper. Thus a tautology by itself lacks semantic 
information, but it may play a role in the structure of a proffered explanation that 
informatively reflects the structure of the relevant ideal text. There is no obvious way of 
incorporating organization into existing accounts of semantic information. 
~4 One particularly difficult problem for a theory of semantic information, especially 
one that focuses on information as selection power, will be to capture some form of the 
de re~de dicto distinction. For example, we may have two proffered explanations of a 
given phenomenon. One correctly but sketchily describes the relevant ideal explanatory 
text; the other is a disjunction of a very full description of the relevant ideal 
explanatory text and a feeble description of some quite irrelevant ideal explanatory 
text. Both explanations would then be true, and we can imagine that (by some intuitive 
measure) both manage overall to exclude an equally large number of irrelevant 
possibilities - the specificity of the first disjunct of the latter making up for the failure to 
eliminate the second disjunct. It may seem that the former explanation is more 
explanatory because it is more about the relevant ideal text than the latter, since the 
former allows us to identify at least some part of the relevant ideal text, while the latter 
does not. Obviously this is part of a general problem about de re and de dicto; 
depending upon one's approach to this problem, one may come up with different 
accounts of semantic information. I am grateful to Timothy McCarthy for drawing my 
attention to this issue. 
~ B. C. Van Fraassen is among those who have argued that there is need for an 
analysis of the notion that certain requests for information may be refused. 
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